

# Wolfgang Leininger, Universität Dortmund

## Selected Publications

### Articles in refereed Journals

„A Generalisation of the `Maximum Theorem“ , *Economics Letters*, 15, 1984, 309-315

„Differentiable Nash Equilibria in Altruistic Economies“, (with John Lane), *Journal of Economics*, 44, 1984, 329-347

„Rawls`Maximin Criterion and Time-Consistency: Further Results“, *Review of Economic Studies*, LII, 1985, 505-513

„Continuous Selections and Fixed points of hemi-continuous Correspondences“, *Methods of Operations Research*, 50, 1985, 31-3

„The Existence of Perfect Equilibria in a Model of Growth with Altruism between Generations“, *Review of Economic Studies*, LIII, 1986, 349-367

„The Continuous Selection Theorem in Euclidean Space: a Proof by Induction“, *Economics Letters*, 20, 1986, 59-62

„Price-Characterisation and Pareto-Efficiency of Game Equilibrium Growth“ (with John Lane), *Journal of Economics*, 46, 1986, 347-367

„On the Existence of Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium in Infinite-Action Games of Perfect Information“ (with Martin Hellwig), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 43, 1987, 55-75

„Escalation and Cooperation in Conflict Situations – The Dollar Auction Revisited , *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 33, 1989, 231-254

„The Sealed-Bid Mechanism for Bargaining with Incomplete Information“, (with Peter Linhart and Roy Radner), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 48, 1989, 63-106

„Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium in Continuous Games of Perfect Information: Existence and Approximation by Discrete Games“ (with Martin Hellwig, Philip Reny and Arthur Robson), *Journal of Economic Theory*, 52, 1990, 406-422

„Patent Competition, Rent Dissipation and the persistence of Monopoly: The role of research Budgets“, *Journal of Economic Theory*, 53, 1990, 146-172

„More Efficient Rent-Seeking“, *Public Choice*, 75, 1993, 43-62

„The Fatal Vote: Bonn versus Berlin“, *Finanzarchiv*, Neue Folge, Heft 1, 1993, 1-20

„On the Scope of Indirect Regulation of Monopolies in the Presence of large Entry Cost“, (with Michael Dröttboom), *Empirica*, 20, 1993, 1-12

„Dynamic Rent-Seeking Games“, (with C. Yang), *Games and Economic Behavior*, 7, 1994, 406-427

- „Expected Revenue of All-Pay and First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions with Affiliated Signals“, (with Erwin Amann), *Journal of Economics*, 61, 1995, 273-279
- „A Non-Cooperative Analysis of Hotelling`s Location Game“, (with Helmut Bester, Andre de Palma, Ernst-Ludwig v. Thadden and Jonathan Thomas), *Games and Economic Behavior*, 12, 1996, 165-186
- „Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions with Incomplete Information“, (with Erwin Amann), *Games and Economic Behavior*, 14, 1996, 1-18
- „A Note on Evolutionary Stability of Bertrand Equilibrium“, (with Burkhard Hehenkamp), *Journal of Evolutionary Economics*, 9, 1999, 367-373
- „Dynamic Rent-Seeking Games“, (with C. Yang), in *Efficient Rent-Seeking: Chronicle of an Intellectual Quagmire*, A. Lockard and G. Tullock (eds.), Kluwer, Boston, 2001, 269-290
- „Duels and the Management of Conflict over Honour: A Bargaining-Theoretic Perspective“, *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, 159, 2003, 248-253
- „On Evolutionarily Stable Behavior in Contests“, *Economics of Governance*, 4, 2003, 177-186
- „Evolutionary Equilibrium in Tullock Contests: Spite and Overdissipation“, (with B. Hehenkamp und A. Possajennikov), *European Journal of Political Economy*, 20, 2004, 1045-1057
- „Fending off one means fending off all: Evolutionary Stability in quasi-submodular aggregative Games“, *Economic Theory*, 29, 2006, 713-719
- “The Generalized Stackelberg Equilibrium of the All-Pay Auction” (mit K. Konrad), *Review of Economic Design*, 11, 2007, 165 -176
- “Evolutionary stable Preferences in Contests”, *Public Choice*, 140, 2009, 341-356
- “Self-enforcing norms and efficient non-cooperative collective action in the provision of public goods”, (with K. Konrad), *Public Choice*, 146, 2011, 501-520
- “Effort Maximization in asymmetric Contest Games with heterogeneous Contestants” (with J. Franke, C. Kanzow und A. Schwartz), *Economic Theory*, 52, 2013, 589-630
- “Lottery versus All-Pay Auction Contests: A Revenue Dominance Theorem”, (with J. Franke, C. Kanzow und A. Schwartz), *Games and Economic Behavior*, 83, 2014, 116-126
- “On the Efficient Provision of Public Goods by Means of Biased Lotteries: The Two Player Case” (with J. Franke), *Economics Letters*, 125, 2014, 436-439
- “Economics without Borders: Economic Research for European Policy Challenges”, Co-Editor, Cambridge University Press, March 2017, 637pp
- “Exploitative Strategies: Consequences for Individual Behavior, Social Structure, and Design of Institutions” (with A. King, M. Kosfeld, B. Greiner and T. Kameda), in *Investors and Exploiters in Ecology and Economics: Principles and Applications*, (Eds. L-A. Giraldeau, P. Heeb and M. Kosfeld), 2017, MIT Press
- “Optimal Favoritism in All-Pay Auctions and Lottery Contests” (with J. Franke and C. Wasser), *European Economic Review*, 2018, 104, 22-37

“Lotteries and Lindahl prices in public good provision” (with J. Franke), *Journal of Public Economic Theory*, 2018, 20, 6, 840-848

„Asymmetric Oligopoly and Evolutionary Stability“ W. Leininger und H. M. Moghadam, *Mathematical Social Sciences*, 2018, 96, 4, 1-9

“Evolutionary Equilibrium in Contests with stochastic Participation: Entry, Effort and Overdissipation” (with Y. Gu and B. Hehenkamp), *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, 2019, 164, 469-485