Die Seminararbeit und der Vortrag können in englischer oder deutscher Sprache vorbereitet und gehalten werden.

This seminar covers advanced topics in microeconomic theory and experimental economics. Seminar topics are based on theoretical and/or experimental papers in the fields of revealed preference, economic and social networks and/or cooperative game theory. Revealed preference postulates that observed choice behaviour can be used to deduce information about the underlying preference and formulates testable axioms for various hypothesis concerning preferences. This provides non-parametric methods for demand analysis. Networks are used to model economic and social situations with respect to the relation between agents. The analysis of those networks ranges from centrality in a network, network formation, stability of networks or allocation on networks among various more. Cooperative games are used to model the worth of cooperation among individuals, while allocation rules are used to allocate this worth among them.

**Topics and Literature (tentative)**

1. Demand and Consumption Theory in Terms of Revealed Preference Axioms
   References: Samuelson (1938), Samuelson (1948), Houthakker (1950)
2. Revealed Preference Axioms and Non-Parametric Demand Analysis
3. Experimental Analysis of Rational Choice
4. Distributive Justice: Theory and Experiments
   References: Becker et al. (2013a), Becker et al. (2013b)
5. Field Experiments
   References: List and Lucking-Reiley (2000), Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (2006), De Mel et al. (2008), Chang et al. (2009), Chowdhury et al. (2011)
6. Networks, Paths, Connectivity and Centrality
7. Bargaining and Power in Networks
8. The Small-World-Experiment
9. Networks in Cooperative Game Theory: Stability and Network Formation
   References: Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005); Dutta et al. (1997)
10. Networks in Cooperative Game Theory: Allocation rules on Networks
References


